Public Opinion

The formation and change of public opinion > Components of public opinion: attitudes and values Top of Form
How many people actually form opinions on a given issue, as well as what sorts of opinions they form, depends partly on their immediate situations, partly on more-general social-environmental factors, and partly on their preexisting knowledge, attitudes, and values. Because attitudes and values play such a crucial role in the development of public opinion, scholars of the subject are naturally interested in the nature of these phenomena, as well as in ways to assess their variability and intensity.
The concepts of opinion, attitude, and value used in public opinion research were given an influential metaphorical characterization by the American-born political analyst Robert Worcester, who founded the London-based polling firm MORI (Market & Opinion Research International Ltd.). Values, he suggested, are “the deep tides of public mood, slow to change, but powerful.” Opinions, in contrast, are “the ripples on the surface of the public's consciousness—shallow and easily changed.” Finally, attitudes are “the currents below the surface, deeper and stronger,” representing a midrange between values and opinions. According to Worcester, the art of understanding public opinion rests not only on the measurement of people's views but also on understanding the motivations behind those views.
No matter how strongly they are held, attitudes are subject to change if the individual holding them learns of new facts or perspectives that challenge his or her earlier thinking. This is especially likely when people learn of a contrary position held by an individual whose judgment they respect. This course of influence, known as “opinion leadership,” is frequently utilized by publicists as a means of inducing people to reconsider—and quite possibly change—their own views.
Some opinion researchers have contended that the standard technical concept of attitude is not useful for understanding public opinion, because it is insufficiently complex. Crespi, for example, preferred to speak of “attitudinal systems,” which he characterized as the combined development of four sets of phenomena: (1) values and interests, (2) knowledge and beliefs, (3) feelings, and (4) behavioral intentions (i.e., conscious inclinations to act in certain ways).
Perhaps the most important concept in public opinion research is that of values. Values are of considerable importance in determining whether people will form opinions on a particular topic; in general, they are more likely to do so when they perceive that their values require it. Values are adopted early in life, in many cases from parents and schools. They are not likely to change, and they strengthen as people grow older. They encompass beliefs about religion—including belief (or disbelief) in God—political outlook, moral standards, and the like. As Worcester's analogy suggests, values are relatively resistant to ordinary attempts at persuasion and to influence by the media, and they rarely shift as a result of positions or arguments expressed in a single debate. Yet they can be shaped—and in some cases completely changed—by prolonged exposure to conflicting values, by concerted thought and discussion, by the feeling that one is “out of step” with others whom one knows and respects, and by the development of significantly new evidence or circumstances.
public opinion. (2009). In Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved October 7, 2009, from Encyclopedia Britannica Online School Edition: http://www.school.eb.com/eb/article-258756

Summary:
According to the article, public opinion is influenced by three main factors: the immediate situation of people, social-environmental factors, and their preexisting knowledge, attitudes, and values.
Political analyst Robert Worcester suggests that one's values is the most important concept in forming public opinion for they are not easily changed. Opinions on the other hand, can be easily changed or swayed. Attitude lies somewhere between the two. According to Worcester, it is necessary to understand the motivations behind those views. Some opinion researchers believe that using the concept of attitude does not aid in the understanding of public opinion because of its complexity and due to how easily attitudes are subject to change. Values are viewed as the most important concept in determining public opinion. They are not likely to change and even get stronger as people get older.
This article relates directly to chapter 7 due to its content on public opinion and more specifically, political socialization. The article discuses values and how they are adopted early in life, most likely from family and schools, which chapter 7 also states. The textbook covers a study that revealed that the majority of young people (about 91%, according to the study) identified with their parent's political party . Beliefs on religion, political outlook, and moral standards are all included in the definition of values.

Voting Rights Act

Court Refuses to Expand Minority Voting Rights
By Mark Sherman Associated Press Writer
WASHINGTON–The Supreme Court limited the reach of the Voting Rights Act on Monday, a decision that could make it harder for some minority candidates to win election when voting districts are redrawn.
In a 5-4 decision, the justices ruled that a portion of the law aimed at helping minorities elect their preferred candidates only applies in districts where minorities make up more than half the population.
The decision could make it more difficult for Democrats, particularly in the South and Southwest, to draw electoral boundaries friendly to black or Hispanic candidates following the 2010 Census.
The Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund said the decision weakens minorities' ability to use the Voting Rights Act to challenge alleged discrimination in electoral districts.
"The Supreme Court decision, if left unchecked, will make redistricting in 2011 and the cause of making districts reflect emerging Latino electoral strength much harder," said Nancy Ramirez, MALDEF's western regional counsel.
With the court's conservatives in the majority, the court ruled that North Carolina erred when trying to preserve the influence of African-American voters even though they made up just 39 percent of the population in a state legislative district.
While not a majority, the black voters were numerous enough to effectively determine the outcome of elections, the state argued in urging the court to extend the civil rights law's provision to the district.
The state said the district should be protected by the section of the law that bars states from reducing the chance for minorities to "elect representatives of their choice."
Justice Anthony Kennedy, announcing the court's judgment, said the court had never extended the law to those so-called crossover districts and would not do so now. The 50 percent rule "draws clear lines for courts and legislatures alike," Kennedy said in ruling against the North Carolina district.
In 2007, the North Carolina Supreme Court had struck down the district, saying the Voting Rights Act applies only to districts with a numerical majority of minority voters. The district also violated a provision of the state constitution keeping district boundaries from crossing county lines, the court said.
Kennedy said that, absent prohibitions like North Carolina's rule against crossing county lines, "states that wish to draw crossover districts are free to do so." But they are not required, he said.
Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito signed onto Kennedy's opinion. Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas agreed with the outcome of the case.
The four liberal justices dissented. A district like the one in North Carolina should be protected by federal law "so long as a cohesive minority population is large enough to elect its chosen candidate when combined with a reliable number of crossover voters from an otherwise polarized majority," Justice David Souter wrote for himself and Justices Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and John Paul Stevens.
Ginsburg also suggested that Congress could amend the law to cover districts like the one in North Carolina.
Civil rights groups that urged the court to uphold the North Carolina plan said such districts help to diminish racially polarized voting over time because the candidate who is the choice of black or Hispanic voters must draw some white support to win election.
In April, the court will hear a more significant challenge to another provision of the Voting Rights Act, requiring all or parts of 16 states with a history of racial discrimination to get approval before implementing any changes in how elections are held.
The court's familiar ideological split in this case strongly suggests that Kennedy could hold the key to the outcome in the April case as well, said Nathaniel Persily, an election law expert at Columbia University.
In another election-related case, the court let stand an appeals court decision that invalidated state laws regulating the ways independent presidential candidates can get on state ballots.
Arizona, joined by 13 other states, asked the court to hear its challenge to a ruling throwing out its residency requirement for petition circulators and a June deadline for submitting signatures for independent candidates in the November presidential elections.
Independent presidential candidate Ralph Nader sued and won a favorable ruling from the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco.
The cases are Bartlett v. Strickland, 07-689, and Brewer v. Nader, 08-648.


Summary
On March 9, 2009, the Supreme Court limited the reach of the Voting Rights Act. This decision could make it more difficult for minority candidates to win elections. The case ended in a 5-4 decision, with the justices ruling that the law only applied in districts where the minority made up more than a half of the total population. According to The Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, this decision weakens minorities' ability to use the Voting Rights Act when challenging discrimination in electoral districts. The states argued that the district should be protected by the section of the law that bans states from reducing the chance for minorities to elect the representatives that they want.
This article applies to chapter, Political Participation, because it directly references the Voting Act of 1965. This Supreme Court case is an excellent example of The Voting Rights Act coming in to play in today's politics and how it still plays an important role. The text book discusses the Voting Rights Act when it was first created and how it suspended the use of literacy tests and provided criminal penalties for interfering with the right to vote.

Mistrust of Government

1.
Policies, procedures, and people: sources of support for government? *.
Social Science Quarterly 83.3 (Sept 2002): p789(21). (8340 words)

Author(s):
Stacy G. Ulbig.
Document Type:
Magazine/Journal
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Full Text :COPYRIGHT 2002 University of Texas at Austin (University of Texas Press)
Objective. Many have written about the public's low opinion of the federal government; however, the theoretical sources and consequences of political trust have been empirically elusive. Drawing on the procedural justice framework, this study investigates the structure and consequences of people's mistrust of the federal government. Methods. Using data from various years of the National Election Study (NES), this research investigates the relationship between policy, procedural, and personal concerns and support of government. Results. Judgments about policy outputs, the process by which these policies develop, and the people involved in this process are shown to be sources of governmental trust, and certain aspects of trust are shown to have important behavioral consequences. Conclusions. These findings help to explain the failure of previous research into the causes and consequences of political trust. The various policy and process judgments that the NES Index combines play important independent roles in e xplaining political trust itself and its relationship with political behaviors and other attitudes.
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Many have written about the public's low opinion of the federal government. We know that the American public holds the political system in surprisingly low regard, but we understand less about the reasons for and consequences of these negative feelings. Studies linking the public's low trust in government to demographic characteristics, interpersonal trust levels, and policy outputs or outcomes have given, at best, mixed results. The consequences of low trust in the federal government have been equally elusive. There is only scant evidence that diminishing political trust has measurable impacts on political behavior at the individual level or on system stability at the aggregate level.
The procedural justice literature offers an intriguing explanation for why people mistrust government and the behavioral consequences of this mistrust. Work in this area suggests that people are concerned not only with the outcomes of decision-making processes but with the procedural and personal aspects of that process as well. People care about having a voice in the decision-making process and about feeling that the decision-making body is neutral, trustworthy, and respectful of the participant. These concerns have been illustrated to affect people's assessment of the legitimacy of Congress (Tyler, 1994) and the Supreme Court (Tyler and Mitchell, 1994), as well as their evaluation and endorsement of political leaders (Tyler and Caine, 1981; Tyler, Rasinski, and McGraw, 1985) and their presidential vote choice (Rasinski and Tyler, 1988). It seems likely that these concerns could affect feelings of support for government as well.
Previous Studies of the Causes of Trust in Government
In the 1950s and 1960s, researchers generally viewed political trust as a reflection of certain sociological and psychological factors peculiar to each individual (Craig, 1993), but studies linking the public's trust in government to individual-level characteristics and attitudes yielded disappointing results. Empirical research revealed that a range of demographic characteristics and attitudinal factors were unrelated to feelings of political trust (Agger, Goldstein, and Pearl, 1961; Citrin and Luks, 1998; Citrin et al., 1975; Cole, 1973; Lyons, 1978; Owen and Dennis, 2001). Similarly, feelings of interpersonal trust offered little, if any, insight into attitudes about trust in government (Agger, Goldstein, and Pearl, 1961; Aberbach and Walker, 1970; Finifter, 1970; Owen and Dennis, 2001). It thus appears that individual-level characteristics count for little when trying to explain feelings of political trust. We must, therefore, look beyond the individual to the political system itself to understand people' s trust in government.
The instrumental vision of political trust does just this by looking to the political system and arguing that people trust government more when they receive their desired policy outputs (Easton, 1965). Empirical analyses have lent some support to this argument (Craig, 1993; Miller and Borrelli, 1991; Miller, 1979; Owen and Dennis, 2001). Instrumental concerns, however, comprise only half of Easton's conception of political support--diffuse support of regime-level institutions may also play a role in shaping political trust. The distinction between individual and institutional judgments and how they relate to political trust has been greatly debated (Abramson and Finifter, 1981; Citrin, 1974; Citrin and Green, 1986; Citrin et al., 1975; Cook, 1979; Miller, 1974; Parker and Davidson, 1979; Parker and Parker, 1993; Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan, 1992), and this work fits well with arguments that trust evaluations are based largely on political actors' competency and morality (Barber, 1983; Hart, 1978; Wright, 1 976). Most recently, researchers have started to link political attitudes to the processes occurring within political institutions, arguing that perceptions of procedural inefficiency resulting from conflict drive down evaluations of Congress (Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht, 1997; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 1995).
Although research into political trust has shown that the traditional demographic and attitudinal predictors fair poorly, that instrumental concerns play some role, and that trust evaluations of individual politicians and political institutions have different sources, little has been done to reconcile these varied perspectives. Research on political trust has explored a range of possible causes, but it has largely failed to take account of the multidimensional nature of trust. We are, consequently, left with little sense about the source of political trust.
Previous Studies of the Consequences of Mistrust in Government
The effects of the public's low governmental trust have been equally elusive, with empirical studies providing little evidence of the theoretical consequences. Some argue that cynicism about government and the political process should reduce participation and the quality of democracy (Easton, 1965; Nye, 1997), and other note the potential link between trust and electoral turnout (Muller, 1977; Milbraith and Goel, 1977; Pollock, 1983; Craig, 1980; Southwell, 1985). Further, mistrust has been argued to erode confidence in governmental institutions, which in turn leas to noncompliance with laws (Nye, 1997). Hence, those lacking trust might be more willing to use unconventional means of political expression, including protest and acts of civic violence (Muller, 1977; Muller and Jukam, 1977; Pollock, 1983; Nye, 1997).
Despite the prevalence of such theorizing, little convincing empirical evidence of a connection between trust and political behavior exists. While some studies show that distrust stimulates a willingness to engage in violence or favorably predisposes people toward voting for extreme candidates (Aberbach and Walker, 1970), other analyses find no relationship between distrust and anti-system behavior (Muller, Jukam, and Seligson, 1985; Pierce and converse, 1989). Still other studies reveal that a low degree of trust in political authorities is part of the attitudinal predisposition needed for an individual to support political violence but not enough by itself to compel such behavior (Craig and Maggiotto, 1981; Muller, 1972; Useem and Useem, 1979). The findings with regard to conventional political participation are no more encouraging. The link between mistrust and voter turnout (Miller, 1980), as well as a range of other conventional political behaviors (Kazee and Roberts, 1998), has been elusive. While our theories tell us that low trust levels should matter, empirical support for the connection between mistrust and political behavior at the individual level or system stability at the aggregate level has not been forthcoming.
A Multidimensional Definition of Political Trust
The complexity of political trust itself is perhaps the source of our limited knowledge about the origins and consequences of the attitude. Feelings of trust in government are not likely to have a single cause. Instead, the attitude probably results from judgments about several political objects or phenomena. Similarly, political behavior is likely to be driven more by certain aspects of political trust than others. Thus, a better understanding of the causes and consequences of political trust must start with the conception of trust as a multidimensional attitude.
Political trust has been defined as a basic evaluative or affective orientation toward government (Stokes, 1962) founded on how well the government operates according to people's normative expectations (Miller, 1974), and theoretical considerations of trust suggest that people have such expectations about a range of subjects. People seem to be concerned about the adequacy of policy outcomes, as well as the competency and morality of political actors, and about the operation of the political process. The complexity of the traditional trust in government index further suggests the dimensionality of the attitude. The set of survey measures developed by researchers at the University of Michigan's National Election Studies (NES) taps several expectation-performance comparisons. "The criteria of judgment implicit in these questions were partly ethical, that is, the honesty and other ethical qualities of public officials were part of what the sample was asked to judge. But the criteria extended to other qualities as well, including the ability and efficiency of government officials and the correctness of their policy decisions" (Stokes, 1962:64).
While frequently used, the NES trust index is not unquestioned. Barber (1983:78) decries the "jumbled index," suggesting that two of the questions tap competency concerns, two tap the fiduciary responsibility dimension of trust, and the "do what is right" question, because of its ambiguous wording, could be about either. More recently, others have suggested that the index masks our understanding of political trust by confusing the attitude with its possible causes (Craig, 1993:24-25; Owen and Dennis, 2001:209). In essence, the traditional NES trust measure has itself hindered our ability to understand the phenomenon of trust in government.
This is not to say that the individual items in the index cannot be used to further our understanding of political trust. In fact, by using the "do what is right" question as a basic measure of political trust and other NES trust items as predictors of this more global sentiment, we might begin to unravel the sources of political trust. Breaking the index apart and investigating its components might allow us to see how judgments about different aspects of government help to shape the more general feeling of political trust. Further, the tenuous connection between political trust and political behavior can be analyzed more specifically. While general political trust has rarely been shown to affect political behavior, it is possible that certain aspects of trust might have a greater impact on some activities than on others.
The Components of Trust
Policy evaluations have been the workhorse of much political trust research, with trust thought to move in tandem with satisfaction about government outputs. More recently, work in the procedural justice area suggests that perceptions of governmental processes play an equally important role. People do not only care that the policies produced by the government meet their demands. They also worry about the procedures that the government follows in deciding on these policies, and they consider the characteristics of the government authorities involved in this process.
Concerns about the Policy
Political science has a long history of believing that feelings about government become more negative when people are unhappy with policy outcomes (Easton, 1965; Lane, 1965; Citrin et al., 1975; Miller, 1974). This tradition suggests that when people get what they want, they do not care how they get it. Feelings of political trust appear to derive solely from judgments about how well the government produces the desired policies. Empirical support for the contention that individuals who view policy outcomes as matching their demands will be more supportive of the government than those who perceive a mismatch has been less than overwhelming. Confidence in government dropped most steeply in times of economic vitality in the late 1960s (Ribbing and Theiss-Morse, 2001), and cross-sectional analyses offer only limited support for the connection between policy satisfaction and governmental approval (Caldeira, 1986; Mueller, 1973; Patterson and Caldeira, 1990). So while policy concerns probably play some role in form ing political trust, there is more to the story than mere policy satisfaction.
Concerns about the Process
In addition to wanting policies that match their demands, citizens have concerns about the process by which decisions are made (see, e.g., Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 1995; Lind and Tyler, 1988; Thibaut and Walker, 1975). They care about both the procedures followed and the character of the people carrying out these procedures. While there is a distinct contrast between governmental outputs and the processes of government, the differences between procedural and personal concerns are subtler. The procedural and personal components of trust are clearly linked conceptually but take different referents. Procedural concerns involve judgments about the more "institutional" aspects of the process--whether the citizen feels he or she has a meaningful voice in the decision-making process and whether the decision-making arena is neutral and efficient. Personal concerns involve judgments about the more "individual" aspects of the process--whether the elected representatives are honest and competent.
Although the institutional and individual aspects of the decision-making process are not necessarily viewed as distinct dimensions of political trust, the differences should be kept in mind and the character of the individual actors should not be ignored. Technical competence and fiduciary obligation have long been held up as theoretical hallmarks of trustworthy representatives (Barber, 1983; Hart, 1978; Wright, 1976), and more recent empirical work suggests that people want to turn decision-making responsibility over to representatives who understand and respect their wishes and will not take advantage of them (Theiss-Morse and Hibbing, 2001). Even the procedural justice research, with its emphasis on the more "institutional" aspects of process, highlights the role that assessments about individual actors play. It argues that people generally recognize that ceding authority to another person provides an opportunity for exploitation and they solve this dilemma by using the authority's character as an indicato r of whether the authority's actions are likely to be harmful (Lind et al., 1993:225; Rasinski and Tyler, 1988:17).
Thus, three key process elements can be expected to play a role in shaping feelings of governmental trust. People appear to like having their voices heard in the decision-making process (Lind and Tyler, 1988; Thibault and Walker, 1975), and they seem to prefer the process to be neutral with honest people and efficient with competent people (Tyler, 1989; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 1995).
Voice/Standing. Having some control over the decision-making process makes people feel better about the outcome of that process. The perceived distribution of control between participants and decisionmakers influences people's reactions to third-party allocation and dispute-resolution decisions (Thibault and Walker, 1975). And process control, that is, the participant's control over the presentation of evidence, has been shown to be even more important than decision control, which is the participant's control over the actual decisions made (Lind, Lissak, and Conlon, 1983; Tyler, 1987; Tyler, Rasinski, and Spodick, 1985). Thus, citizens who feel they have a voice in the government's decision-making process will be more supportive of the government than those who do not feel they have such a voice.
However, just having a say may not be enough. Procedural justice research further establishes that people care that the authority listens to them. Interpersonal treatment during social interactions gives people clues about their status within the group (Lind and Tyler, 1988). When ignored, people believe that the authorities have low regard for them; polite and respectful treatment communicates higher status. When authorities show respect for individuals, they gain more trust. Feelings of governmental support are likely enhanced as individuals feel authorities pay more attention to their input (or the input of people like themselves). Thus, individuals who feel that they (or people like them) have good standing with government officials will be more supportive of the government than those who feel they lack such standing.
Neutrality/Honesty. Citizens have a long-term social relationship with the members and institutions of government. They cannot always receive their favored outcome but must sometimes compromise and defer to others' desires and needs. Thus, a simple focus on outcome favorability in a single situation is unrealistic (Tyler, 1989), and people, under the assumption that over time everyone will benefit from the application of fair decision-making procedures, seem to seek a neutral arena in which to resolve conflict (Thibault and Walker, 1975). It is therefore expected that individuals who feel that the government's decision-making process is neutral will be more supportive of the government than those who feel that the process does not operate in a neutral manner.
The long-term nature of the governmental relationship also leads people to examine the intentions of the authorities who are given discretion about the enactment of procedures. Their support depends on predictions about what will happen in the future (Heider, 1958), and the authorities' use (or abuse) of discretion is shaped by their intentions. Trust involves the belief that the intentions of the authorities are benevolent (Tyler, 1989). People want to know that the authorities are honest and will deal equitably with everyone involved. Consequently, individuals who feel that government officials act in an honest manner will be more supportive of the government than those who feel that government officials do not act in an honest manner.
Efficiency/Competency. People also seem to consider the efficiency with which the government makes its decisions, focusing mainly on the conflict and gridlock present in the political decision-making process (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 1995). When the process fails to produce adequate solutions to societal problems because it is filled with such bickering, people appear less likely to support the government (see, e.g., Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht, 1997). Individuals who feel that the government's decision-making process is efficient are likely to be more supportive of the government than those who feel that the process does not operate in an efficient manner.
Similarly, at a very basic level, people want authorities who are capable of performing the decision-making tasks before them (Barber, 1983; Hart, 1978; Wright, 1976). People want their authorities to be able to fulfill the demands of their jobs. Without such ability, there is little hope that any solutions will be forthcoming. It is therefore expected that individuals who view government officials as competent will be more supportive of the government than those who view government officials as incompetent.
Research Design
Three different dependent variables are used. First, political trust is examined using the standard NES question: "How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right?" Respondents answering "none" or "some of the time" were coded 0 and those answering "most of the time" or "just about always" were coded 1. Second, political participation is investigated using an additive index of the following electoral activities: voting; attending political meetings, rallies, etc.; working for one of the parties or candidates; displaying a campaign button, bumper sticker, or sign; giving money to one of the parties or candidates (not available in 1970); and trying to influence others' votes. Third, feelings of obligation to obey the law are explored using an index of three questions about hypothetical civil disobedience: attending protest meetings/marches, disobeying an unjust law, and participating in a sit-in/demonstration (single item in 1976).
Policy concerns are measured with items tapping the respondent's satisfaction with government action in a variety of policy areas (accommodations and school integration; school busing; involvement in Vietnam; national health care; and economic, inflation, and unemployment policy) and the policy area most important to the respondent. Whenever possible, policy satisfaction is operationalized with the single item about the government's handling of the most important problem as identified by the respondent. This item allows the respondent to identify the problem most salient to him or her and assess the government's performance in this area. In analysis of data from years where this item is unavailable (1968, 1970, and 1974), the alternative measure is used.
Procedural concerns about the neutrality and efficiency of the governmental process are measured with separate items. Neutrality concerns are captured with a single item about whether the respondent thinks the federal government is run for the "benefit of all the people" or for only a "few big interests." Efficiency concerns are measured with a single item on whether the respondent thinks that the government "wastes a lot of the money [citizens] pay in taxes." While this measure is not an ideal operationalization of the inefficiency described by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995) and Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht (1997), it does tap the notion that the government is wasteful or inefficient for some (unstated) reason.
Although feelings of voice and standing are conceptually distinct, they are closely related empirically. Two items were selected to tap voice concerns. They ask how much attention the government pays to what the people think and whether people like the respondent have any say about what government does. Three items were chosen to gauge standing. They ask whether public officials care much about what people think, whether those elected to Congress lose touch with the people, and how much attention congressmen pay to the people who elect them. These five items are highly correlated, and a confirmatory factor analysis reveals that they do nor load separately. Consequently, the voice and standing items are combined into a single "voice/standing" index.
Personal concerns about the honesty and competency of government officials are tapped by separate questions. Honesty is measured with a question about whether "the people running government are crooked." Competency is measured with a question about whether "the people running government are smart people who usually know what they are doing."
Data Considerations
The variables used here to operationalize the components of trust are the traditional NES "evaluation of government" items. While these measures have been criticized, they should not be summarily rejected. Much of the criticism aimed at the NES trust in government measure has been with the combination of several different value judgments into a single index. The suggestion has been that the index obscures the impact that different judgments have on political trust and that using the components separately might provide more valuable insight.
Further, the application of a new conceptual framework to the items enhances their value. Ideally, of course, items tailored to the procedural justice theory should be used, but such measures do not readily present themselves. Even though the NES measures are not perfect operationalizations of the procedural justice framework, they are reasonable proxies. As such, they provide a first look at the usefulness of this theoretical approach to the understanding of political trust. 'While further investigation using improved measures should be undertaken, the present exercise can provide useful preliminary evidence.
Analyses and Findings
To investigate the sources and consequences of political trust, a series of regression equations is examined. First, general political trust serves as the dependent variable, which is modeled as a function of policy and process concerns. In this way, the impact that judgments about the policies, procedures, and people of government have on feelings of political trust can be assessed. Then, trust serves as an independent predictor of political participation and feelings of obligation to obey the law. Since it is expected that general political trust will play little role in explaining these variables, the policy and process components of trust are finally used to predict participation and obligation. This more careful examination of the ways judgments about the policies, procedures, and people of government affect political participation and feelings of obligation to obey the law will allow us to see which specific aspects of trust are most important in each case.
These models also include control variables for race, gender, age, education, income, ideology partisanship, and interpersonal trust (when available). Each model is tested using NES data from years in which all necessary variables are available. (1) The pattern of results over time, rather than the performance of a solitary variable in any single year, is key. A variable's consistent performance across time indicates that the finding is nor the result of data idiosyncrasies in a particular year.
Sources of Trust
The results provide strong support for the contention that process concerns, in addition to policy desires, play a large role in shaping feelings of political trust. Judgments about the policies, procedures, and people of government consistently exhibit strong, positive influences on feelings of trust in government (see Table 1). Only honesty (in 1968) and competency (in 1974) fail to maintain their positive and significant relationships with trust in government.
Further, policy, process, and person concerns exhibit an impressive substantive impact on feelings of political trust. The probability of a person trusting the government greatly increases when that person's concerns are met. In fact, believing that government officials are honest increases ones probability of trusting government by an average of almost 24 percentage points. A person who feels government officials are dishonest has about a 32 percent chance of trusting government, whereas a person who believes such officials to be honest has about a 56 percent chance of expressing governmental trust. (2) Concerns about voice and standing exhibit the strongest influence on feelings of governmental trust. A person who has the lowest estimation of his or her voice and/or standing has, on average, about a 24 percent chance of trusting the government, while a similar person who has the highest sense of voice and/or standing has a 59 percent chance of doing so-an increase of 35 percentage points.
Interestingly, the independent variables of interest greatly out-perform the control variables in these models. As previous research indicates, the usual demographic and attitudinal variables offer little help when trying to explain trust in government. Of the control variables, only interpersonal trust is consistently related to governmental trust, and it exhibits the second lowest substantive impact of the significant variables in the model. An individual with the highest interpersonal trust level is about 13.1 percentage points more likely to trust government than the least interpersonally trusting individual.
Overall, it appears that satisfaction with the procedures and people of government, in addition to receiving desired policy outcomes, helps to boost feelings of trust in government. Being satisfied with governmental policy, having a meaningful voice in the process, viewing the process as efficient and neutral, and seeing the authorities as honest and competent all lead to increased feelings of trust in the federal government.
Consequences of Trust
Consistent with past research, political trust performs poorly as a predictor of political participation and feelings of obligation to obey the law. Regression analyses reveal that feelings of political trust do not consistently show a significant relationship with political participation or feelings of obligation to obey the law over the seven years examined here. (3) Conversely, and consistent with past research, the control variables tell a big part of the behavioral story. A more refined look at political trust, however, reveals that certain components of the attitude are more strongly related to participation and feelings of obligation than others. Believing that constituents have a meaningful voice in the process consistently boosts participation in conventional behavior, and the perception of a procedurally biased process consistently drives down feelings of obligation to obey the government.
As Table 2 illustrates, concerns about voice and standing show a consistent, positive relationship with political participation, while none of the other policy, process, or person concerns seem to play a role in explaining participation. Believing that one has a meaningful voice in the political process appears to increase the likelihood of participation in political activities. In fact, a person with the highest feelings of voice and standing will engage in about 8 percent more political activities, on average, than a person with the lowest feelings of voice and standing (a difference of 0.554 on the seven-point scale).
This finding comports well with the political participation scale's emphasis on electoral activity. The constituent-representative relationship is at the heart of campaign and election activity and we would therefore expect concerns about constituent-representative interaction to motivate involvement in such activity. 'When a person believes that a healthy communication between constituents and representatives exists (that voice and standing are high), he or she is more likely to feel that involvement in electoral activities will result in a meaningful outcome. The election of the desired candidate will provide the constituent with a ready ear for his or her concerns. Conversely, a person who believes that there is little communication between constituents and representatives is not likely to believe that the election of one candidate rather than another makes much difference. No matter which candidate gets elected, the representative will not listen to him or her anyway.
The results are much the same with regard to feelings of obligation to obey the law. As Table 3 shows, only concerns about procedural neutrality show a consistent, positive relationship with feelings of obligation, while none of the other instrumental, procedural, or personal concerns seem to play a consistent role in explaining support for acts of civil disobedience. Believing that the political process does not fairly operate increases the likelihood of supporting acts of civil disobedience. As illustrated with the 1976 data, a person who feels that the process is fair to all groups has about a 40 percent chance of supporting civil disobedience, while a person who feels the process is unfair has a 50 percent chance of supporting such activity.
As the procedural justice research repeatedly illustrates, a neutral arena is key to the continued support of the decision-making institution. The perception of a "level playing field" enables people to accept more easily undesired outcomes because they believe that a fair application of procedures will, over time, come to benefit them. As long as the governmental process is seen as a fair one that does not favor one group over another, people seem willing to obey the law. However, when that process appears so tilted in one group's favor that other groups do not stand a chance of benefiting, support wanes. When the game is perceived as an unfair one, people seek to change the game by supporting civil disobedience.
Overall then, it appears that while general political trust does not have a great impact on political participation or feelings of obligation to obey the law, certain aspects of political trust more strongly relate to participation and feelings of obligation than others. Believing that constituents have a meaningful voice in the process encourages participation in conventional behavior, and the perception of a procedurally biased governmental process consistently drives down feelings of obligation to obey the government. So while general trust does not play much of a role in predicting participation or feelings of obligation, certain aspects of trust prove very important.
Summary and Conclusions
Overall, this pattern of results suggests that political trust does indeed have multiple sources. Judgments about policy outputs, the process by which these policies develop, and the people involved in this process are important. While previous research has largely failed to establish a link between governmental trust and political behavior or other political attitudes, the more fine-grained analyses presented here reveals the subtle ways in which trust does affect behavior and attitudes. Not all aspects of political trust matter for all behaviors and attitudes. Only one aspect of political trust--concern over voice and standing--appears to impact engagement in conventional political activities. Similarly, the analyses show that one aspect of political trust--perceptions of procedural neutrality--consistently affects feelings of obligation to obey the government.
These findings help explain the failure of previous research into the causes and consequences of political trust. The weak empirical findings of this research are likely artifacts of conception and measurement rather than true nonrelationship. The traditional NES trust in government index fails to distinguish adequately the various aspects of political trust because it masks the varied components of the attitude. By meshing the more global "do what is right" question, which does a good job of capturing general political trust, with judgments about specific governmental characteristics, the index masks the sources of the attitude as well as its consequences. As the analyses presented here reveal, the various policy and process judgments that the NES index combines play important independent roles in explaining political trust itself and its relationship with political behaviors and other attitudes.
When conceived of in a multidimensional way, the sources and consequences of political trust become more apparent. Concerns about the policies, procedures, and people of government provide a ready explanation for the sources of political trust. Further, this more detailed conception of political trust reveals that certain aspects of the attitude are more important for some behaviors than for others. When all the components of political trust are combined into one index, it is not possible to see these subtle relationships.
The strength of these findings suggests that more research should be conducted into the multidimensionality of political trust. The development and use of measures that more closely reflect the procedural justice theory should be paramount in this pursuit. The use of existing data can offer only limited tests of the theory. It is therefore vital that more finely tailored measures be developed and used to test the value of the procedural justice framework. TABLE 1

The Effect of Policy, Procedural, and Personal Concerns on Trust in
Government (1)

1968 1970 1972

Trust Components

Policy Satisfaction (2) 0.250 ** 0.316 ** 0.488 ***
(0.121) (0.167) (0.190)
Voice/standing 0.215 *** 0.236 *** 0.306 ***
(0.065) (0.071) (0.076)
Neutrality 1.144 *** 0.888 *** 1.527 ***
(0.260) (0.243) (0.278)
Efficiency 0.593 ** 0.452 ** 0.519 **
(0.246) (0.233) (0.252)
Honesty 0.220 0.457 *** 0.553 ***
(0.195) (0.193) (0.191)
Competency 0.605 *** -0.547 *** 0.530 **
(0.236) (0.235) (0.237)

Control Variables

Age -0.014 * -0.006 -0.031 ***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Education -0.211 ** 0.014 -0.024
(0.109) (0.109) (0.104)
Income 0.007 ** -0.014 -0.050 **
(0.040) (0.061) (0.030)
Nonwhite -0.358 -0.112 -0.417
(0.343) (0.302) (0.442)
Female -0.174 -0.388 ** -0.059
(0.234) (0.233) (0.239)
Party ID (directional) -0.081 0.093 0.173
(0.168) (0.173) (0.160)
Party ID (dummy) -0.301 0.011 0.055
(0.268) (0.270) (0.252)
Ideology (directional) -0.015 ** 0.003 0.130
(0.009) (0.007) (0.108)
Ideology (dummy) -0.324 -0.206 0.307
(0.257) (0.265) (0.300)
Interpersonal trust 0.248 ** -- 0.139 *
(0.112) -- (0.106)

Constant -1.066 -2.453 *** -3.988
(0.893) (0.918) (1.022)
Number of cases 458 456 538
Cox & Snell [R.sup.2] 0.279 0.268 0.373
% correctly predicted 75.33 73.9 78.25
% reduction of error 35.44 41.66 46.81
Chi-square (3) 149.948 *** 142.388 *** 250.737 ***

1974 1976 1978

Trust Components

Policy Satisfaction (2) 0.454 *** 0.232 * 0.576 ***
(0.173) (0.150) (0.151)
Voice/standing 0.292 *** 0.140 *** 0.271 ***
(0.069) (0.058) (0.054)
Neutrality 0.831 *** 1.526 *** 0.997 ***
(0.254) (0.206) (0.193)
Efficiency 0.812 *** 0.931 *** 0.632 ***
(0.250) (0.201) (0.200)
Honesty 0.549 *** 0.555 *** 0.800 ***
(0.178) (0.148) (0.133)
Competency 0.146 0.492 *** 0.640 ***
(0.209) (0.187) (0.171)

Control Variables

Age -0.007 -0.005 0.004
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Education 0.079 -0.052 0.128 **
(0.083) (0.083) (0.075)
Income -0.054 ** 0.011 0.013
(0.030) (0.019) (0.011)
Nonwhite -0.861 ** -0.024 0.030
(0.450) (0.359) (0.323)
Female -0.262 -0.060 -0.159
(0.210) (0.186) (0.169)
Party ID (directional) 0.000 -0.064 -0.116
(0.135) (0.122) (0.116)
Party ID (dummy) -0.031 -0.004 -0.030
(0.224) (0.198) (0.178)
Ideology (directional) 0.139 * 0.023 0.025
(0.088) (0.079) (0.069)
Ideology (dummy) -0.173 0.335 -0.461 **
(0.269) (0.278) (0.216)
Interpersonal trust 0.159 ** 0.246 *** --
(0.093) (0.089) --

Constant -4.840 -5.120 -6.230 **
(0.904) (0.820) (0.757)
Number of cases 600 791 1005
Cox & Snell [R.sup.2] 0.293 0.288 0.276
% correctly predicted 76.83 76.99 78.71
% reduction of error 39.03 34.76 29.15
Chi-square (3) 208.014 *** 269.176 *** 324.883 ***

1980

Trust Components

Policy Satisfaction (2) 0.648 ***
(0.189)
Voice/standing 0.190 ***
(0.074)
Neutrality 1.423 ***
(0.249)
Efficiency 0.613 ***
(0.255)
Honesty 0.674 ***
(0.198)
Competency 0.674 ***
(0.230)

Control Variables

Age -0.005
(0.007)
Education -0.325 ***
(0.108)
Income 0.002
(0.022)
Nonwhite -0.542
(0.459)
Female -0.252
(0.229)
Party ID (directional) -0.147
(0.150)
Party ID (dummy) 0.361 *
(0.245)
Ideology (directional) 0.009
(0.085)
Ideology (dummy) 0.128
(0.286)
Interpersonal trust --
--

Constant -4.294 ***
(0.975)
Number of cases 617
Cox & Snell [R.sup.2] 0.229
% correctly predicted 81.2
% reduction of error 20
Chi-square (3) 160.410 ***

* p < 0.10;

** p < 0.05;

*** p < 0.01 (one-tailed test).

(1)Dependent variable is trust in the federal government (0 = not
trusting; 1 = trusting). Cell entries are logistic regression
coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses). The substantive
results remain the same when ordered probit analyses are performed on
the four-point trust measure.

(2)Alternative policy satisfaction measures were tested in the 1972 and
1976-1980 models. The performance of the alternative measure and the
other variables in the model were unaffected by this substitution.

(3)The chi-square value is the difference between the restricted
(constant only) model and the unrestricted (full) model.TABLE 2

The Effect of Policy, Procedural, and Personal Concerns on Political
Participation (1)

1968 1970 1972

Trust Components

Policy satisfaction (2) 0.032 -0.033 -0.227 ***
(0.057) (0.077) (0.092)
Voice/standing 0.102 *** 0.076 ** 0.046
(0.032) (0.033) (0.037)
Neutrality -0.066 -0.133 0.145
(0.134) (0.119) (0.138)
Efficiency -0.058 -0.019 0.027
(0.111) (0.103) (0.118)
Honesty -0.107 -0.076 -0.065
(0.092) (0.090) (0.095)
Competency -0.243 ** 0.143 -0.011
(0.119) (0.115) (0.121)

Control Variables

Age -0.003 0.009 ** -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Education -0.062 0.303 0.186 ***
(0.051) (0.050) (0.050)
Income -0.039 ** 0.068 *** 0.041 ***
(0.019) (0.029) (0.014)
Nonwhite -0.053 -0.073 0.207
(0.162) (0.141) (0.210)
Female -0.122 -0.033 0.016
(0.112) (0.107) (0.114)
Party ID (directional) -0.049 -0.061 0.052
(0.080) (0.079) (0.076)
Party ID (dummy) 0.275 ** 0.278 ** 0.370 ***
(0.127) (0.123) (0.121)
Ideology (directional) 0.004 -0.001 -0.046
(0.004) (0.003) (0.052)
Ideology (dummy) 0.374 *** 0.222 ** 0.029
(0.123) (0.123) (0.145)
Interpersonal trust 0.109 ** -- 0.112 **
(0.055) -- (0.054)

Constant -0.082 -0.836 ** 0.644 *
(0.436) (0.428) (0.473)
Number of cases 452 444 540
Adjusted [R.sup.2] 0.120 0.165 0.114
F-statistic 4.858 *** 6.815 *** 5.320 ***

1974 1976 1978

Trust Components

Policy satisfaction (2) -0.008 -0.093 * -0.118 *
(0.074) (0.068) (0.079)
Voice/standing 0.083 *** 0.071 *** 0.063 ***
(0.028) (0.026) (0.026)
Neutrality -0.088 -0.064 -0.107
(0.119) (0.103) (0.110)
Efficiency -0.024 -0.091 -0.226 **
(0.110) (0.094) (0.107)
Honesty -0.118 0.013 0.079
(0.078) (0.068) (0.068)
Competency 0.082 -0.040 -0.092
(0.089) (0.084) (0.085)

Control Variables

Age 0.083 *** 0.009 *** 0.013 ***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Education 0.111 *** 0.185 *** 0.245 ***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.037)
Income 0.053 *** 0.029 *** 0.014 ***
(0.012) (0.008) (0.005)
Nonwhite -0.040 0.077 0.300 **
(0.167) (0.150) (0.162)
Female -0.216 *** -0.147 ** -0.101
(0.089) (0.083) (0.083)
Party ID (directional) -0.046 -0.001 0.057
(0.058) (0.055) (0.056)
Party ID (dummy) 0.254 *** 0.267 *** 0.190 **
(0.095) (0.088) (0.087)
Ideology (directional) -0.052 * -0.047 * -0.096 ***
(0.037) (0.035) (0.033)
Ideology (dummy) 0.021 0.239 ** -0.022
(0.116) (0.120) (0.106)
Interpersonal trust 0.123 *** 0.038 --
(0.039) (0.052) --

Constant -0.492 * 0.014 -0.001
(0.369) (0.346) (0.347)
Number of cases 600 785 1009
Adjusted [R.sup.2] 0.138 0.124 0.108
F-statistic 6.978 *** 7.965 *** 9.102 ***

1980

Trust Components

Policy satisfaction (2) -0.068
(0.085)
Voice/standing 0.114 ***
(0.030)
Neutrality -0.071
(0.117)
Efficiency 0.020
(0.115)
Honesty -0.099
(0.083)
Competency -0.153 *
(0.098)

Control Variables

Age 0.003
(0.003)
Education 0.095 **
(0.041)
Income 0.017 **
(0.009)
Nonwhite -0.107
(0.177)
Female -0.041
(0.092)
Party ID (directional) 0.032
(0.061)
Party ID (dummy) 0.203 **
(0.095)
Ideology (directional) -0.081 **
(0.035)
Ideology (dummy) 0.080
(0.119)
Interpersonal trust --
--

Constant 0.590
(0.890)
Number of cases 612
Adjusted [R.sup.2] 0.066
F-statistic 3.900 ***

* p < 0.10;

** p < 0.05;

*** p < 0.01 (one-tailed test).

(1)Dependent variable is a political participation index (ranges 0-6).
Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients and standard errors (in
parentheses). The substantive results remain the same when ordered
probit analyses are performed.

(2)Alternative policy satisfaction measures were tested in the 1972 and
1976-1980 models. The performance of the alternative measure and the
other variables in the model were unaffected by this substitution.
TABLE 3

The Effect of Policy, Procedural, and Personal Concerns on Obligation to
Obey the Law (1)

1968 1970 1972 1974

Trust Component
Policy Satisfaction (2) -0.052 0.227 *** 0.112 -0.147 *
(0.078) (0.096) (0.104) (0.106)
Voice/standing -0.022 0.012 -0.071 ** 0.029 (0.045) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041)
Neutrality 0.224 0.032 0.454 *** 0.305 **
(0.185) (0.148) (0.156) (0.171)
Efficiency -0.259 ** -0.114 -0.106 -0.191
(0.155) (0.129) (0.133) (0.157)
Honesty -0.084 0.091 0.147 * 0.073
(0.128) (0.113) (0.109) (0.112)
Competency 0.087 0.085 0.227 ** -0.017
(0.161) (0.142) (0.137) (0.128)
Control Variabl
Age 0.015 *** 0.012 *** 0.023 *** 0.021 ***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Education -0.290 *** -0.279 *** -0.314 *** -0.100 **
(0.069) (0.062) (0.057) (0.050)
Income 0.021 0.032 0.037 ** 0.028 *
(0.026) (0.035) (0.016) (0.018)
Nonwhite -1.783 *** -0.864 *** -0.763 *** -0.474 **
(0.224) (0.173) (0.240) (0.239)
Female 0.118 0.274 ** -0.215 ** -0.114
(0.153) (0.132) (0.128) (0.127)
Party ID (directional) 0.028 -0.121 0.159 ** 0.186 **
(0.108) (0.098) (0.086) (0.083)
Party ID (dummy) -0.207 0.072 0.224 ** 0.083
(0.170) (0.153) (0.136) (0.136)
Ideology (directional) 0.025 *** 0.019 *** 0.003 -0.029
(0.005) (0.004) (0.059) (0.053)
Ideology (dummy) -0.375 ** -0.163 -0.083 0.373 **
(0.168) (0.152) (0.164) (0.165)
Interpersonal -0.006 -- 0.038 -0.048
(0.076) -- (0.061) (0.056)
Constant 4.151 *** 3.221 *** 2.980 *** 2.695 ***
(0.596) (0.524) (0.534) (0.530)
Number of cases 408 454 536 599
Adjusted [R.sup.2] 0.308 0.225 0.209 0.096
F-statistic 12.305 *** 9.775 *** 9.845 *** 4.953 ***

1976

Trust Component
Policy Satisfaction (2) 0.070 **
(0.033)
Voice/standing -0.020 *
(0.012)
Neutrality 0.103 **
(0.049)
Efficiency -0.039
(0.045)
Honesty -0.016
(0.033)
Competency 0.077 **
(0.040)
Control Variabl
Age 0.005 ***
(0.001)
Education -0.022 *
(0.017)
Income 0.027 ***
(0.004)
Nonwhite -0.296 ***
(0.073)
Female -0.066 **
(0.040)
Party ID (directional) 0.017
(0.026)
Party ID (dummy) 0.064 *
(0.042)
Ideology (directional) 0.002
(0.017)
Ideology (dummy) 0.123 **
(0.057)
Interpersonal -0.024 *
(0.018)
Constant 0.949 ***
(0.166)
Number of cases 789
Adjusted [R.sup.2] 0.072
F-statistic 4.815 ***

* p <0.10

** p <0.05

*** p <0.01 (one-tailed test).

(1)Dependent variable is support of civil disobedience (ranges 0-2).
Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients and standard errors (in
parentheses). The substantive results remain the same when ordered
probit analyses are performed.

(2)Altemative policy satisfaction measures were tested in the 1972 and
1976-1980 models. The performance of the altemative measure and the
other variables in the model were unaffected by this substitution.
* Direct all correspondence to Stacy G. Ulbig, Department of Political Science, Southwest Missouri State University, 901 South National Avenue, Springfield, MO 65804. The data in this analysis are available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. The author will share all coding materials. The author would like to thank Denise Torres, Bernadette Jungblut, the Johns--Alford and Hibbing--and several anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.
(1.) Data availability forces this analysis to focus on the 1960 to 1980 time period. Unfortunately, the National Election Studies data for more recent years do nor contain all the necessary variables on which this analysis relies. One of the dependent variables and six of the seven key independent variables are not consistently available in the post-1980 period.
(2.) Base probabilities were calculated by setting the variable of interest to its lowest value and all other variables in the model to their mean or mode (race, gender, partisanship, and ideology). The probability change was calculated by setting the variable of interest to its maximum value and then subtracting the base probability from the new probability. The probabilities discussed are the average base and changes for the entire 1968-1980 period.
(3.) These results are available from the author upon request.
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[c] 2002 by the Southwestern Social Science Association
Source Citation:Ulbig, Stacy G. "Policies, procedures, and people: sources of support for government? *." Social Science Quarterly 83.3 (Sept 2002): 789(21). Expanded Academic ASAP. Gale. UDLibSEARCH - Main Account. 27 Sept. 2009 .
Gale Document Number:A91305525




2. Summary
It is understood that in America, the public holds a low opinion of the federal government. This article presents several causes and consequences of political behavior that contribute to the negative view of the political system. It also analyzes past studies of the causes and consequences of mistrust in government and how they do not present a valid explanation as to why Americans feel the way they do. Studies from the 1950's and 1960's showed that political trust was viewed as "a reflection of certain sociological and psychological factors peculiar to each individual". Due to the disappointing results, new research was conducted and it was revealed that demographic characteristics and factors related to attitude were not associated to the feelings of political trust. Of the studies of the consequences of mistrust in government, there have been mixed results. Some studies have shown that mistrust may lead people" to use unconventional means of political expression, including protest and acts of civic violence". Others have said that there is no link between mistrust of government and anti-system behavior. Political trust is now based on the outcomes of policy and the morality of "political actors" and the operation of the process. The overall results of the studies revealed that such components as contentment with the procedures and the people of government while also receiving the desired outcomes, contributes to increased feelings of trust in the government.